Game Theory and Applications Volume 14 by unknown
Game Theory and Applications
Volume 14 (2009)
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Dynamic Regularization of Self-Enforcing International
Environmental Agreement in the Game of Heterogeneous Players . . . . . 2–22
M. Dementieva, Y. Pavlova, V. Zakharov
Abstract
In the presented paper we consider a coalition formation game with heteroge-
neous players, where a central issue is a problem of international cooperation towards
pollution control. The main concern is to provide a better insight into asymmetric
pattern and characterize size and structure of a stable agreement when abatement
target is succeeded over a fixed and finite period of time.
For this purpose we suppose that all nations are allocated among K groups with
respect to their welfare function. To define a voluntary membership of an inter-
national environmental agreement (IEA), we apply the concept of a self-enforcing
coalition from oligopoly literature and determine equilibrium abatement commit-
ments for each nation.
We have assumed that once a self-enforcing IEA emerges, signatories decide to
perform the required emission reduction uniformly. As soon as the formed coalition
initiates activities on emission decrease and the first results are observable, further
agreement stability can be in danger. Withdrawal of some nations from the agree-
ment and accessing of others would imply that the coalition will undergo structural
change, which in its turn causes sequential switch to another abatement goal.
Presented analyses and examples reveal the following results. Self-enforcing
IEA, which performs pollution decrease according to uniform scheme, that has been
myopically picked up at the initial moment, is stable only over a certain part of
the path. Once abatement has reached a threshold level, external stability fails and
free-riders have incentives to access the agreement.
This occurs because the uniform pollution reduction scheme sets abatement tar-
gets, which differ from optimal ones both for IEA members and free-riders. To
protect the coalition against free-riding, we shall continue with constructing a dy-
namic abatement scheme, which goes along with optimal choice and can depict
agreement time-consistency
A general approach for solving differential public good games
and a Comparison to the Static Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23–39
C.-O. Ewald
Abstract
We study a class of differential public good games and show how static public
good games can naturally be embedded into this class. This allows us to compare
the outcomes in the static and the dynamic case. In the dynamic case we study the
feedback Nah-equilibria and compare these to the Nash equilibria of the correspond-
ing static game. To solve for feedback the Nash equilibria in the dynamic case, we
solve the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellmann equation by using the method of characteristic
functions. Analytical results are given.
A Version of the Elfving Optimal Stopping Time Problem
with Random Horizon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40–53
E.Z. Ferenstein and A. Krasnosielska
Abstract
An optimal stopping time problem and multi-person stopping games with ran-
dom horizon and players’ priorities are considered. Players observe sequentially of-
fers Y1, Y2, ... at jump times τ1, τ2, ... of a Poisson process. Y1, Y2, ... are independent
identically distributed random variables with common piecewise continuous known
distribution function F . Each accepted offer Yn results in a reward Xn = g(Ynr(τn))
if τn < M , and 0 otherwise, where M is an independent random horizon, r is a non-
increasing discount function and g is an utility function. If more than one player
wants to accept an offer then the player with the highest priority (the lowest or-
dering) gets the reward. Optimal selection strategies are obtained on the basis of
a general theorem showing that a model with random horizon may be reduced to
a model with a modified discount function. The game is a generalization of the
Elfving stopping time problem to the case with random horizon, and a modification
of multi-person stopping games with priorities. Influence of stochastic and hazard
rate orders on game values is analyzed. Application to a full information secretary
type problem is given.
Stochastic Differential Games to Innovation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54–79
A.A. Keller
Abstract
Dynamic differential games have been widely applied to the timing of product
and device innovations. Uncertainty is also inherent in the process of technological
innovation: R&D expenditures will be engaged in an unforeseeable environment
and possibly lead to innovations after a random time interval. J. F. Reinganum
enumerates such uncertainties and risks: feasibility, delays in the process, imitation
by rivals. Uncertainties generally affect the fundamentals of the standard differ-
ential game problem: discounted profit functional, differential state equations of
the system, initial states. Two ways of resolution may be taken: firstly, stochastic
differential games with Wiener process and secondly differential games with deter-
ministic stages between random jumps (Poisson driven probabilities) of the modes.
The player will then maximize the expected flows of his discounted profits sub-
ject to the stochastic state constraints of the system. In this context, the state
evolution is described by a stochastic differential equation SDE (the Itoˆ equation
or the Kolmogorov forward equation KFE). According to the P. Dasgupta and J.
Stiglitzs model, R&D efforts exert direct and induced influences (through accumu-
lated knowledge) about the chances of success of innovations. The incentive to
innovate and the R&D competition can be supplemented by a competition around
a patent. This presentation is focused on such essential economic and managerial
problems (R&D investments by firms, innovation process, and patent protection)
with uncertainties using stochastic differential games, modeling with Itoˆ SDEs and
queueing models. The computations are carried out using the software MATHE-
MATICA 5.1 and other specialized packages.
Bayesian Communication Leading to a Nash Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . 80–87
T. Matsuhisa, P. Strokan
Abstract
A Bayesian communication in the p-belief system is presented which leads to a
Nash equilibrium of a strategic form game through messages as a Bayesian updating
process. In the communication process each player predicts the other players’ ac-
tions under his/her private information with probability at least his/her belief. The
players communicate privately their conjectures through message according to the
communication graph, where each player receiving the message learns and revises
his/her conjecture. The emphasis is on that both any topological assumptions on
the communication graph and any common-knowledge assumptions on the structure
of communication are not required.
Studying Cooperative Games using the Method of Agencies . . . . . . . . 88–103
J. Nash
Abstract
The scheme of agencies represents the method of the coalitions formation, where
the coalition can choose a leading player who becomes the authorized agent rep-
resenting the interests of the whole coalition. As well as in the real world, these
leading players can attract new players to maximize income of coalition. The game
situation is modeled as that of a repeated game (as if the game is infinitely or in-
definitely repeated with no ”discounting”) and we seek to find an equilibrium in
that context. This equilibrium concept is quite similar to the concept of equilib-
rium under evolutionary pressures (or ”natural selection”). Then we seek to find
for the players, which are parties that have quite limited actual opportunities for
bargaining and negotiative actions (because they have nothing like the full range
of human verbal communications possibilities that they could use in the process of
optimizing), a type of equilibrium such that each of the game parties is not capable
of making any refinement of his/her strategic behavior pattern that would improve
his/her payoff expectations prospect. The work presents an exhaustive experiment
on the behavior of specialized robot players that are designed to effectively bargain
or negotiate for obtaining favorable outcomes in terms of ”the division of the spoils”
as regards the payoffs realized from the cooperative game.
Differential Coalitional Environmental Management Game . . . . . . . . 104–113
L.A. Petrosyan, N.V. Kozlovskaya
Abstract
In this paper the problem of allocation over time of total cost incurred by coali-
tions of countries in a coalitional game of pollution reduction is considered. The
Nash equilibrium in the game played by coalitions is computed and then the value
of each coalition is allocated according to some given mechanism between its mem-
bers. Mechanism for allocation over time of total individual costs so that the initial
agreement remains valid for the whole duration of the game is proposed. This guar-
antees the time consistency of solution which means that if one renegotiates the
agreement at any intermediate instant of time assumed that the coalitional solution
has prevailed from initial date till that instant, then one would obtain the same
outcome.
Argumentation and Time in IPR Issues: the ALIS Project Game of Deterrence
Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114–140
M. Rudnianski, T. Lalonde
Abstract
The paper adapts a game theoretic approach to the dynamics of argumentation.
It was shown that two sorts of connections exists: the link between the dynamic
of argumentation and propositional logic and the link between propositional logic
and games of deterrence, through the graphs of deterrence associated with these
games. Thereby we focus on a multi-layer approach that bridges the fields of systems
dynamics, propositional logic, and games of deterrence. More precisely, we consider
the development of an argumentation as a dynamic system, and to that end propose
an interpretation of a dynamic system in the framework of argumentation. In the
previous research the Games of Deterrence and the deterrence approach on the
graph have been already explored, so here we shall establish a second one-to-one
mapping to give an interpretation of a system of logical propositions as a game
of deterrence, which solutions will define the truth value of the propositions under
consideration. It will thus enable to model a process of argumentation as a game
of deterrence, in which the playability properties of a strategy will determine the
validity of an argument.
Three-Member Committee Looking for a Specialist
with Two Hight Abilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141–146
M. Sakaguchi
Abstract
An optimal stopping problem belonging to 3-player 2-ehoice n-stage sequential
game is studied. A three-player committee is looking for a specialist with two kinds
of high abilities. There are n applicants. The committee interviews each applicant
one-by-one and it decides it’s R(=reject) or A(=accept) by simple majority over
each member’s choice of R/A. Payoff to each player is the minimum of the two
kinds of abilities of the applicant accepted by the committee. The solution without
using computer is given.
Contractual Stability and Competitive Equilibrium
in a Pure Exchange Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147–166
V.A. Vasil’ev
Abstract
In the paper, a game-theoretical analysis of some stable outcomes in pure ex-
change economies is given. We deal, mostly, with an equilibrium characterization of
unblocked allocations generated by recontracting process close to that introduced
by V.L.Makarov (1980). Rather mild assumptions, providing coincidence of the
corresponding contractual core and the set of Walrasian equilibrium allocations, are
established, and two examples, demonstrating relevance of the main assumptions,
are proposed.
Time Consistency in Cooperative Differential Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167–189
N.A. Zenkevich
Abstract
The paper considers differential game in which there is a possibility of coopera-
tion among players. It is assumed that players cooperate in a grand coalition and
maximize their total payoff. The time consistency of the cooperative optimality
principle is verified. In the case of time inconsistency of optimality principle the
procedure of re-distribution of the players’ payoffs along the cooperative trajectory
to achieve time consistency is proposed. The multicriteria control problem is defined
by the system of differential equations. Pareto optimality is considered as solution
concept in this class of problems. The numerical examples represent theoretical
results.
